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Brazil’s Olympic-Era Anti-Corruption 
Reforms 
BY ANDREW B. SPALDING†  
INTRODUCTION 
A country once renowned for glorifying corruption now leads 
what may be the furthest-reaching anti-corruption investigation in 
history.  Brazil, once typified by its “Brazilian jeitinho” way of 
creatively navigating social problems,1 now executes “Operation Car 
Wash,” bringing down political and business leaders by the dozens.2  
So too has Brazil’s Congress adopted a series of dramatic, and 
effective, new anti-corruption laws, in response to public outcries for 
reform.  It is deeply ironic, but not at all coincidental, that Brazil 
concurrently hosted the Summer Olympics.  This paper chronicles the 
extraordinary series of events that connect – in a line that is straight 
but certainly not obvious – Brazil’s modern anti-corruption movement 
with its hosting of the 2016 Summer Games.   
Brazil’s history gave rise to the Brazilian jeitinho and  associated 
systemic corruption.3  But after a 1988 constitutional revolution and an 
era of soaring economic optimism, Brazil would pursue, and then win 
in 2007 and 2009 respectively, the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 
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appeared in a self-published ebook, OLYMPIC ANTI-CORRUPTION REPORT:  BRAZIL AND THE 
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 1. Juliana Mello, The Brazilian Way of Doing Things, BRAZIL BUS. (Mar. 26, 2012), 
http://thebrazilbusiness.com/article/the-brazilian-way-of-doing-things. 
 2.  Brian Nicholson, Brazil’s Operation Car Wash, INT’L BAR ASS’N (Apr. 8, 2015), 
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=7960b146-65c4-4fc2-bb6a-
c6fbb434cd16. 
 3.  Infra Part I. 
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Summer Olympics.4   Immediately thereafter, an unforeseen series of 
political and economic developments – including the Mensalão 
corruption scandal, a sharp downturn in Brazil’s economic prospects, 
and then the government’s increase in public transportation fares – 
would spark public outrage over bad governance generally and 
corruption specifically.  These ultra-expensive sporting mega-events 
became symbols of everything the people were protesting.5   
As this article shows, Brazil’s public institutions would respond 
in two dramatic ways.  First, Congress adopted a series of four 
important laws – here called the “Four Pillars” – that created a new 
anti-corruption legal regime.6  Second, federal prosecutors would 
launch “Operation Car Wash,” which utilized the new legal tools that 
certain of those new anti-corruption laws created.7  The result is 
beyond ironic:  many of the very political and business leaders who 
pursued the Olympic bid, benefited illicitly from the Olympic 
preparation, and even helped to enact the new anti-corruption laws, 
have been taken down in the reform movement they helped to create.  
I. THE TRADITIONAL CULTURAL CONTEXT  
Jeitinho is variously translated as the “little way out,” 
“adroitness,”8 a “knack,” or even a “clever dodge” way of 
accomplishing tasks.9  It can include “talking yourself out of a fine 
when paying a bill late, jumping the queue if you see some 
acquaintance ahead in the queue, or asking for a receipt with a higher 
amount (than what you actually paid for) so that you can claim more 
money back for expenses.”10  The Brazilian Jeitinho is described as a 
uniquely “Brazilian way” of doing such things and is seen as integral 
to the national identity of Brazil, “o pais do jeitinho” or “the land of 
jeitinho.”11  One group of Brazilian scholars notes a general belief that 
the Brazilian jeitinho “identifies Brazil as a nation” and is “central to 
 
 4.  Infra Part II. 
 5.  Infra Part II.A. 
 6.  Infra Part III. 
 7.  Infra Part III.D.1.  
 8.  Peter B. Smith et al., How Distinctive are Indigenous Ways of Achieving Influence? 
A Comparative Study of Guanxi, Wasta, Jeitinho, and “Pulling Strings,” 43 J. OF CROSS-
CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 135, 137 (2011). 
 9.  Maria Cristina Ferreira et al., Unraveling the Mystery of Brazilian Jeitinho: A 
Cultural Exploration of Social Norms, 38 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL., (Dec. 5, 
2011), at 331, 331. 
 10.  Id. at 331. 
 11.  Id. 
8_SPALDING.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/17  8:12 AM 
190 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 32:188 
 
the collective psyche of a whole nation.”12 
Jeitinho’s roots can be traced to Portuguese colonization, which 
created a contrast between the highly hierarchical forms of social 
control imported from Europe with a more native preference for 
informal and affectionate social relationships.13  With the end of 
colonization in 1822, the country would enter a century and a half of 
often violent oscillations between highly decentralized and ostensibly 
democratic but highly ineffective representative governments, and 
highly centralized military dictatorships, neither of which tended to 
elicit trust in government.14  This pendulum swung with particular 
force in the late twentieth century.  After a series of mid-century 
ineffective governments the military seized control in 1964.15 The 
military created a strong centralized government which stimulated 
economic growth but was widely perceived as oppressive and corrupt.  
The transformation occurred in 1988 with the founding of the modern 
Republic of Brazil, a constitutional government founded on checks-
and-balances, separation of power, federalism, and the protection of 
individual rights.16  This revolution would also sow the seeds of 
Brazil’s modern anti-corruption movement.   
But the many years of colonization, dictatorship, and highly 
ineffective government had already given rise to jeitinho.  The so-
called “Brazilian dilemma” – between a native cultural preference for 
informal, affective relationships and the impersonal, hierarchical, and 
ineffective governments of colonization and military dictatorship – 
helped to create this jeitinho, in which interpersonal strategies are used 
to navigate through hierarchical governmental structures.17  Jeitinho 
becomes “a typically Brazilian way to overcome bureaucracy” and 
“break laws and norms to attain a certain objective.”18  Brazilians thus 
learned how to beat the system, even at its own game.   
 
 12.  Id. at 331. 
 13.  Id. at 332. 
 14.  See, e.g., ROLLIE E. POPPINO ET AL., BRAZIL, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (2017), at 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/78101/Brazil/25036/. 
 15.  HISTORY WORLD, HISTORY OF BRAZIL, 
http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?groupid=891&HistoryID=aa88 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
 16.  See, e.g., David V. Fleischer, Government and Politics, in BRAZIL: A COUNTRY 
STUDY, (Rex A. Hudson ed.), Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1997; Keith S. 
Rosenn, Separation of Powers in Brazil, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 839, 850–51 (2009). 
 17.  Ferreira et al., supra note 10, at 332. 
 18.  Id. 
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Scholars, and particularly Brazilian scholars, have disagreed on 
the extent to which jeitinho is synonymous with corruption.  Brazilian 
anthropologist Roberto DaMatta distinguishes between “positive 
jeitinho,” which does not cause damage to others, and “negative 
jeitinho,” which knowingly breaks the law and more closely 
approximates corruption.19  Similarly, Professor Livia Barbosa sees a 
distinction between “dar um jeitinho” (to have a way out) and “jeitinho 
Brasileiro” (the Brazilian way out), where the former refers to 
corruption while the latter refers to a creativity and pragmatism that do 
not threaten social order.20  Another Brazilian scholar, Alberto Carlos 
Almeida, found that Brazilians in the abstract tend to clearly 
distinguish between three categories:  jeitinho, favor, and corruption. 
Favor implies reciprocity and is based on trust and does not involve a 
violation of established laws or norms; jeitinho may be engaged in with 
strangers, and involves only a minor infraction; while corruption 
involves substantial material gain.21  Some scholars have found that a 
spectrum exists within the minds of Brazilians, with favor at the 
positive end, corruption at the negative end, and jeitinho somewhere 
in the middle.22  But regardless of the cultural and intellectual appeal 
of these clean academic distinctions, other scholars found through 
interviews that Brazilians had trouble distinguishing between the three 
in practical scenarios.23 
Despite this legacy of colonization and dictatorships, Brazilians 
hoped that winning and then hosting the Olympic Games would 
announce a new era in Brazilian history.  They were right, though 
perhaps not at all in the way they expected. 
II. WINNING THE OLYMPIC GAMES 
The 2009 announcement that Brazil would be the first South 
American city in history to host the Olympic Games was met with 
large public gatherings celebrating the news.24  In what was then an era 
of great optimism, the Olympics (in conjunction with the FIFA World 
Cup) were expected to announce to the world Brazil’s arrival as a 
 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Smith et al., supra note 9, at 137. 
 21.  Ferreira et al., supra note 10, at 332–33. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  See, e.g., Shasta Darlington, Brazilians Celebrate Olympics Bid in Rio de Janeiro, 
CNN (Oct. 2, 2009, 11:35 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/10/02/rio.celebration/. 
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modern, developed, and capable country, and to stimulate Brazil’s 
economic development.  Carlos Roberto Osorio, Secretary General of 
the Brazilian Olympic Committee, gave the following interview, 
showing the depth of Brazilian optimism: 
Our motivation to participate in this process is to take advantage 
of an event like the Olympic Games to make a real difference in the 
city and in the country, in various ways. First, in terms of the city of 
Rio itself, [it is] the amount of investment in infrastructure that the 
Games will bring to the city. Actually, Rio didn’t ask Brazil for money 
to do many new things; we are accelerating existing processes. 
Because of the time frame of the Games, things that would be done in 
[twenty] years will be done in seven years. We are talking about metro 
expansion, roads, airport renovation. So, the infrastructure of the city 
will be transformed — and with that, the quality of life. Also, the 
ability to attract additional investment.  But, these are the tangible 
[outcomes] of the story — and in our view, the smallest part of the 
story. We are not shy to say that Brazil is a country that has social 
problems. One of the biggest problems that we have is the inequalities 
within our society. We view sports, and the Olympics Games in 
particular, as an excellent tool to foster social integration, to foster and 
to motivate young people to join sports, and [to make] Olympic values 
[part] of their future lives. So the social legacy of the Games will be a 
very, very important part of our project. Everything that is going to be 
done in Rio [relates to] a vision of physical legacy – that’s very 
important. But more important is this big opportunity to leverage 
[social] programs that already exist, to foster integration within the 
society, and to raise a younger generation to a better standard of living. 
And sports is an excellent tool to foster education and to deliver this 
legacy.  So, we are very thrilled by the legacy potential. And I think 
that’s one of the reasons that Rio was chosen.25 
Promoters of the Olympics thus touted the Games as a way of 
stimulating economic and cultural development.  Indeed, winning the 
FIFA World Cup and the Summer Olympics would set a kind of high-
water mark for Brazil’s confidence in its ability to govern. But the next 
several years would bring about something of a confidence drought. 
A. Brazil’s Olympic Seven-Year Itch 
The Olympic Games are routinely awarded seven years in 
 
 25.  Interview by Knowledge@Wharton with Carlos Roberto Osorio, Felipe Monteiro, 
and Ken Shropshire, Brazil’s Gold: How Rio Won its Olympic Bid, (Mar. 3, 2010). 
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advance, giving the host country sufficient time to prepare.26  But these 
seven years in Brazil’s history would do much more than simply buy 
time for infrastructure development.  They would instead stimulate an 
historic pivot in approaches and attitudes toward corruption. 
Mensalão, Potuguese for “big monthly stipend,” was a bribery 
scheme in which the Workers’ Party27 made secret payments t0 
members of congress in return for supporting the party’s legislative 
agenda.28  The scandal erupted in 2005 when an opposing party 
member claimed the Workers’ Party was paying members of congress 
30,000 reais a month (around $12,000 USD in 2005), and the money 
had come from the public treasury by way of fake advertising contracts 
entered into by state-owned companies.29  From the initial accusation, 
the scandal spread to include bribery allegations against the state-run 
postal system and extortion allegations against the Workers Party.30  
The scandal eventually implicated numerous congressmen and Jose 
Dirceu, then-Chief of Staff to President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva.31 
The Supreme Federal Tribunal of Brazil convicted twenty-five people 
including top legislators, senior Working Party officials, businessmen, 
and former president da Silva’s Chief of Staff; many were sentenced 
to prison.32 In a country where the legal code offers extraordinary 
protections to the political and financial elite,33 the event was a social 
and legal turning point.  It was a landmark case, being the first-time 
high-ranking politicians were found guilty of corruption in a criminal 
trial and served prison terms.34  Indeed, the convictions gave the 
 
 26.  See generally, Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Games Candidature Process,  
https://www.olympic.org/all-about-the-candidature-process (last visited May 15, 2017). 
 27.  The Workers’ Party won the Brazilian presidency in 2003 with the election of Luiz 
Inacio Lula da Silva. Christopher Minister, Luiz Inacio Lulu da Silva, Brazil’s Progressive 
President, THOUGHTCO. (Last updated July 2, 2014), https://www.thoughtco.com/luiz-inacio-
lula-da-silva-brazil-2136592 (last updated July 2, 2014). 
 28.  Q & A Brazil’s ‘Big Monthly’ Corruption Trial, BBC (Nov. 16, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19081519; See H.J., infra note 32. 
 29.  Chris Barrett, Mensalao: The Implications of Brazil’s Largest Corruption Scandal, 
ARG. INDEP. (Dec. 26, 2012), http://www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/mensalao-
the-implications-of-brazil%e2%80%99s-largest-corruption-scandal/. 
 30.  H.J., The Economist Explains: What is Brazil’s “Mensalao”?, THE ECONOMIST, 
(Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/11/economist-
explains-14. 
 31.  See Id. 
 32.  Simon Romero, Key Brazilians in Graft Case Must Go to Jail, Court Says, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/15/world/americas/key-brazilians-
in-graft-case-must-go-to-jail-court-says.html.  
 33.  Id. 
 34.  See The Meaning and Implication of the “Mensalao,” Brazil’s Largest Trial on 
Political Corruption, WILSON CTR. (Oct. 4, 2013, 10:00 AM to 12:00 PM), 
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Brazilian people and international observers hope that the courts may 
finally be able to keep corruption in check.35 
So too would the economic mood change dramatically in those 
years.  As the lead-off letter in the famous BRIC acronym,36 optimism 
swirled around Brazil in the first decade of the twenty-first century.  
But economic conditions worsened dramatically in the 2010s.  Global 
commodity prices declined sharply, and President Dilma Rousseff 
adopted a controversial policy of incurring substantial government 
deficits to spend heavily on social programs and tax breaks for favored 
industries.  Though political support for her Workers Party increased, 
the economy began to shrink, credit-rating agencies downgraded 
Brazil’s debt to junk status, and the public’s optimism about both its 
economic future and trust in the government’s ability to navigate 
through economic challenges worsened significantly.37  
Finally, in June 2013, the government’s proposed rate hikes in 
public transportation incited protests and even riots in more than eighty 
cities – Rio, Sao Paulo, and Brasilia, as well as Manaus, Recife, Belo 
Horizonte, Curitiba, Porto Alegre, and others.38  Numbering in the 
hundreds of thousands, protestors voiced their concerns over not just 
the public transportation rate hikes, but poor government and the cost 
overruns of hosting the upcoming sporting events.39  As one 
commentator put it, the protestors spoke out against “poor quality of 
public services, lavish investment on international sporting events, low 
standards of healthcare and wider unease about inequality and 
corruption.”40  Protests continued into 2014, as so many of the 
infrastructure projects promised for the dual mega-events of the World 
 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-meaning-and-implication-the-mensalao-brazils-
largest-trial-political-corruption. 
 35.  Romero, supra note 34.   
 36.  Brazil, Russia, India, and China – BRIC, INVESTOPEDIA 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bric.asp (last visited May 15, 2017) (referring to Brazil, 
Russia, India, and China and “the idea that China and India will . . . become the world’s 
dominant suppliers of manufactured goods and services . . . while Brazil and Russia will 
become similarly dominant as suppliers of raw materials.”). 
 37.  See Brazil’s Fall, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 2, 2016), 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21684779-disaster-looms-latin-americas-biggest-
economy-brazils-fall.  
 38.  Jonathan Watts, Brazil Protests Erupt Over Public Services and World Cup Costs, 
GUARDIAN (June 18, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/18/brazil-protests-
erupt-huge-scale. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
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Cup and Olympics were scaled down, delayed, or cancelled.41   
As a result, and in response to the diverse crises of the period 
between winning and hosting the 2016 Games, Brazilian democracy 
would do precisely what it was designed to do:  adopt laws that the 
people demanded.  
III. THE FOUR PILLARS OF BRAZIL’S ANTI-CORRUPTION REFORMS 
As public discontent mounted, Brazil’s Congress would respond 
by enacting four distinct statutes, two of which were enacted in 2011 
and two in 2013.  They were, to varying degrees, enacted in response 
to the public concerns about governance generally and corruption 
specifically that arose on the eve of hosting the World Cup and 
Olympic Games.  The four pillars are:  (1) the 2011 procurement 
reforms, called the Regime Diferenciado de Contratações and known 
as the RDC;42 (2) the 2011 freedom of information law that addressed 
the government’s role in corruption by obligating agencies to make 
information available to the public;43 (3) the 2013 Clean Companies 
Act that addressed the corporate sector’s role in public corruption by 
creating corporate liability for bribery, incentivizing cooperation with 
government investigations, and incentivizing corporate compliance 
programs;44 and (4) the 2013 organized crime bill which authorized the 
enforcement tools that federal prosecutors would use in the Petrobras 
investigation.45  This combination of anti-corruption laws – enacted in 
 
 41.  Jonathan Watts, Fury and Frustration in Brazil as Fares Rise and Transport Projects 
Flounder, GUARDIAN (Feb. 6, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/06/brazil-
bus-chaos-fare-rise. 
 42.  Law No. 12,462/11; Andy Spalding, Andy Spalding on Brazil’s First Pillar: 
Procurement Reform, FCPA BLOG (July 19, 2016, 6:18AM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/7/19/andy-spalding-on-brazils-first-pillar-procurement-
reform.html. 
 43.  Law No. 12,572/11; Conectas Hum. Rts., Transparency: Freedom of Information 
Law Comes into Effect in Brazil Amid Climate of Distrust, Expectations, and Pressure, (May 
30, 2012), http://www.conectas.org/en/actions/justice/news/transparency-freedom-of-
information-law-comes-into-effect-in-brazil-amid-climate-of-distrust-expectation-and-
pressure.   
 44.  Law No. 12,846/13; GAN BUS. ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL, BRAZILIAN CLEAN 
COMPANY ACT, at http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/anti-corruption-legislation/brazil 
(last updated Nov. 2015). 
 45.  Law No. 12,850/13; Antenor Madruga & Luciano Feldens, Brazil: White-Collar 
Crime Defense, GLOB. INVESTIGATIONS REV. (Aug. 8, 2016), 
http://globalinvestigationsreview.com/insight/the-investigations-review-of-the-americas-
2017/1067457/brazil-white-collar-criminal-defence; Andy Spalding, Andy Spalding on 
Brazil’s Fourth Pillar: The Organized Crime Law, FCPA BLOG (July 28, 2016), 
fcpablog.com/blog/2016/7/28/andy-spalding-on-brazils-fourth-pillar-the-organized-crime-
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such a short span and to such dramatic effect – has few historical 
precedents.   
These four pillars make for a stark contrast between the two BRIC 
nations simultaneously hosting the FIFA World Cup and Olympic 
Games back-to-back.  In Russia – host of the 2014 Winter Olympics 
and 2018 FIFA World Cup – allegations of corruption were rampant. 
But we saw neither a credible legislative response, nor effective 
enforcement actions.  Russian corruption continued in impunity.46  
Brazil, has addressed deeply-rooted public corruption with adopting a 
four-part legislative framework and then a series of enforcement 
actions.47  In so doing, Brazil is self-consciously addressing a culture 
that once tolerated corruption and glorified jeitinho, seeking to move 
beyond a history of official corruption bred under colonization and 
military dictatorships.  Brazil thus redeems Pierre de Coubertin’s idea 
of the Olympic Games as a venue for promoting an ethic of 
international fair play.48 
This section will discuss the four pillars in order of their 
enactment:  first, the procurement reforms; then the freedom of 
information law; the Clean Companies Act will be third; and finally, 
the organized crime law. 
A. The First Pillar: Procurement Reform 
The harms of corruption in the specific realm of government 
procurement are obvious to all.  Government officials may be bribed 
to accept bloated contracts, or inferior products, or both, all at the 
public’s expense.  But in trying to prevent corruption, procurement 
presents a series of counterintuitive, and underappreciated, policy 
trade-offs.  The first trade-off is between transparency and cost.  
Transparency is generally thought to be an antidote to corruption:  
where processes are open to the public, and readily reviewable, the risk 
of cost inflation would seem to go down.49  Put another way, 
 
l.html. 
 46.  See Ilan Berman, Putin’s Olympic Corruption, USA TODAY (Feb. 20, 2014), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/02/20/putin-olympics-sochi-corruption-
russia-column/5655815/. 
 47.  Supra notes 43-45. 
 48.  Pierre de Coubertin was the founder of the modern Olympic Games. Norbert Muller, 
The Idea of Peace as Coubertin’s Vision for the Modern Olympic Movement: Development 
and Pedagogic Consequences, SPORT J. (Mar. 7, 2008), http://thesportjournal.org/article/the-
idea-of-peace-as-coubertins-vision-for-the-modern-olympic-movement-development-and-
pedagogic-consequences/. 
 49.  Transparency and Accountability are the Main Antidotes for Corruption, BARBADOS 
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controlling corruption is a standard cost control mechanism.  But as 
the Brazilian experience has shown, sometimes transparency can 
actually exacerbate cost inflation.50  In this regard, transparency can 
cause the precise harm that anti-corruption measures are designed, at 
least in part, to prevent.  The relationship between transparency and 
cost is thus not as simple as may first appear. 
So too, in procurement as in government generally, do we suspect 
that the concentration of power can give rise to corruption.  We might 
assume multiple companies working on a project would be better than 
a single company with monopolistic control over the project; the 
various companies might tend to keep each other in check, increasing 
accountability and decreasing graft.  But again, experience has shown 
that multiple companies sharing responsibility in procurement projects 
creates inefficiencies that tend to result in increased costs and delays. 
Again, an effort to reduce corruption might increase costs to the public. 
Brazil was keenly aware of these trade-offs, and of the challenges 
inherent in its procurement regime, before the World Cup and 
Olympics. But the mega sporting events became an impetus to 
experiment with a new procurement regime.51  This new regime is at 
least designed to make public procurement more streamlined and 
efficient.52  The extent to which these efficiency-minded reforms will 
create corruption risks remains to be seen.   
Procurement is the acquisition of goods and services.53  In using 
the term, some draw a distinction between public and private 
procurement, and others define the term to include only acquisition by 
a government entity.54  For the purposes of this paper, procurement 
 
FREE PRESS (Feb. 26, 2008, 2:31 PM), 
https://barbadosfreepress.wordpress.com/2008/02/26/transparency-and-accountability-are-
the-main-antidotes-for-corruption/. 
 50.  See The Brazilian Crisis: Lessons from an Emerging Economy, ONE BRIEF (Mar. 17, 
2016), http://www.theonebrief.com/the-brazilian-crisis-lessons-from-an-emerging-economy/. 
 51.  Renato Parreira Stetner & Paulo Henrique Spirandeli Dantas, Public Procurement in 
Brazil PRAC. L. CO. (Mar. 1, 2013), https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/0-521-
5566?__lrTS=20170402065602319&transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&fir
stPage=true&bhcp=1. 
 52.  Andy Spalding, Brazil Emerging, TRANSPARENCY INT’L BLOG (Apr. 9, 2015), 
http://blog.transparency.org/2015/04/09/brazil-emerging/. 
 53.  Procurement, Black’s Law Dictionary Free (2ND ed)., available at 
http://thelawdictionary.org/procurement/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
 54.  Allison Green, Difference in Public v. Private Procurement, CHRON, 
http://work.chron.com/difference-public-vs-private-procurement-28985.html (last visited on 
Apr. 17, 2017); U.S. GEN. SERV. ADMIN., FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION (FAR), (2005), 
https://www.acquisition.gov/sites/default/files/current/far/pdf/FAR.pdf. 
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refers to any acquisition by official Olympic organizing entities 
whether public, private, or a combination of the two.55 For large scale 
events or government projects, such as the Olympic Games, 
procurement is typically accomplished through a regulated process that 
requires potential suppliers of goods and services to bid against each 
other with the goal of maximizing the quality of the good or service 
offered while minimizing its cost.56  
It is no secret that procurement is highly vulnerable to corrupt 
practices.57  The 2004 OECD Global Forum on Governance identified 
lack of transparency and lack of accountability as two of the major 
threats to corruption in procurement.58  At all stages, issues like bribery 
or kickback arrangements could present themselves.  Further, as will 
be discussed below, there are specific corruption risks unique to each 
stage of the procurement process.59 While some are specifically 
addressed in the Clean Companies Act,60 others are addressed by the 
various procurement laws outlined here.61 
Procurement generally consists of three distinct stages: (1) Pre-
Bidding, (2) Bidding, and (3) Post-Bidding stages.62 In the Pre-Bidding 
stage, entities formulate their needs, the process they will use to meet 
those needs, and the timeline that they will provide for the bidders to 
place a bid.63 In the Bidding stage, entities open an invitation to bid and 
after evaluating bids, offer an award, at least in theory, to the best 
bidder.64 Finally, in the Post-Bidding stage, the awarding entity 
 
 55.  As explained earlier, the governing bodies of the 2016 Olympics consist of both 
public and private entities. See id. 
 56.  See generally Nathan Munn, Olympic Procurement: Past, Present, and Future, 
SourceSuite, http://www.sourcesuite.com/procurement-learning/purchasing-
articles/Olympic-Procurement-Past-Present-and-Future.jsp (last visited May 16, 2017). 
 57.  Some, such as those in the OECD, believe that public procurement is the activity 
undertaken by a government that is the most vulnerable to corruption. OECD PRINCIPLES FOR 
INTEGRITY IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, 9 (2009), www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/48994520.pdf.  
 58.  Id. at 3. 
 59.  See U.S. GEN. SERV. ADMIN., OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., PROCUREMENT FRAUD 
HANDBOOK, 13–28 (Dec. 2012), http://www.gsaig.gov/?LinkServID=6486B647-A5DF-
C154-010A408470CAE0B8. 
 60.  See infra Part III.C. 
 61.  For more details on the Clean Companies Act, see generally Andy Spalding et al., 
3.14 Rio 2016 and the Birth of Brazilian Transparency, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT: 
SPORT (2016). 
 62.  OECD, Integrity in Public Procurement: Good Practice from A – Z, 21–25 (2007), 
http://www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/38588964.pdf. 
 63.  Id. at 22. 
 64.  Id. at 24. 
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manages the contract with the bidder and completes payment. 65 
The Pre-Bidding stage is generally the least susceptible to 
corruption.66  At the Bidding stage, however, bidders may engage in 
corruption by independently, or in concert with some or all of the other 
bidders, attempting to influence the outcome of the awarding of the 
bid.67 This can take the form of bid suppression, complimentary 
bidding, bid rotation, or customer or market division.68 All of these 
relate to an attempt to restrict competition and to cause the requestor 
to pay more than it otherwise would.69 
In the Post-Bidding stage, after the award has been granted, 
corruption is often found in instances where costs run over or products 
or services are not delivered.70  This is the stage where things such as 
mischarging costs, charging for products or services that were not 
delivered, and substitution of products or services -- particularly those 
of an inferior quality – occur.71  These various stages of corruption risk 
have been addressed in various Brazilian laws. 
The first piece in Brazil’s Olympic procurement regime is the 
Concessions and Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), which are both 
ways the government can award contracts to private entities to provide 
a public service.72 Concessions are governed by law 8987/95 
(Concession Law) and PPPs are governed by law 11.079/04, passed in 
1995 and 2004 respectively.73 With both concessions and PPPs, the 
government will delegate the provision of a public service during a 
 
 65.  Id. at 25. 
 66.  See generally id. 
 67.  See generally id. at 24. 
 68.  For further discussion on these forms of bid rigging, see OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., 
supra note 59, at 15. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. at 21. 
 71.  Id. at 17-22. 
 72.  See generally Brazil’s Public-Private Partnership Law, BRASIL: A NATION FOR ALL 
https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-
partnership/sites/ppp.worldbank.org/files/ppp_testdumb/documents/brazilppplaw.pdf (last 
visited May 16, 2017). 
 73.  Lei 8.987, de 13 de  Fevereiro de 1995, PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC CIV. HOUSE: 
SUB-OFFICE FOR LEGAL AFF., Agosto 1995 (Braz.); Lei 11.079, de 30 de Dezembro de 2004, 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC CIV. HOUSE: SUB-OFFICE FOR LEGAL AFF., Dezembro 2004 
(Braz.); see also Henrique Frizzo & Pedro Oliveira, Public Procurement in Brazil: Overview, 
WESTLAW (Oct. 1, 2014), 
https://content.next.westlaw.com/Document/I2ef12a181ed511e38578f7ccc38dcbee/View/Fu
llText.html?originationContext=knowHow&transitionType=KnowHowItem&contextData=
%28sc.Default%29. 
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fixed period of time.74 Practically, there is little difference between the 
operation of the concession or the PPP; the main difference is the 
source of funding for the project.   When the government awards 
concessions, the investment for the project comes from the private 
entity.75 Conversely, when a PPP is awarded, the cost of the investment 
is shared by the private entity and the public.76 A common example 
would be the awarding of a company to construct and manage a toll-
road on behalf of the government.  Both Concessions and PPPs have 
been granted in relation to the Olympic Games. 
The second piece of the traditional Brazilian procurement regime 
is the Brazilian Procurement Law 8666/93, which established the rules 
and regulations for public procurement.77  The law applies to general 
government procurement of services, goods, and construction, and 
requires a two-step bidding process to complete a procurement 
project.78 In the first step, the government extends a request for 
proposal (RFP) for the creation of a technical project.79 A technical 
project in this sense is a project that addresses the needs assessment, 
planning, and budgeting phase of the Pre-Bidding stage of the 
procurement project.80  This request is subjected to public bidding and 
the best bid is given the award for the creation of the technical project.81   
After the technical project is completed, the government then 
moves to the second step of bidding which is again open to the public 
and uses the technical project from the first step to determine the needs, 
budget and other planning of the remainder of the procurement project. 
In the case of the Procurement Law, bidding is open and transparent, 
allowing others to see what bids have been in the past and see the bids 
of their competitors once the bidding process has opened.82 Adding up 
 
 74.  Frizzo & Oliveira, supra note 73. 
 75.  INT’L L. OFF., Infrastructure Project and Feasibility Studies: Opportunities (July 14, 
2015), http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/Projects-
Procurement/Brazil/TozziniFreire-Advogados/Infrastructure-projects-and-feasibility-studies-
opportunities# 
 76.  Frizzo & Oliveira, supra note 73. 
 77.  Lei 8.666, de 21 de Junho de 1993, PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC CIV. HOUSE: SUB-
OFFICE FOR LEGAL AFF., Junho 1993 (Braz.); see also Frizzo & Oliveira, supra note 73. 
 78.  CONSTITIUÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 22 (Braz.); Government 
Procurement Law and Policy: Brazil, LIBR. OF CONGRESS (2015), 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/govt-procurement-law/brazil.php#Constitutional Principles; 
see also lei 8.666, supra note 86. 
 79.  Frizzo & Oliveira, supra note 73. 
 80.  See generally OECD, supra note 71, at 21. 
 81.  Frizzo & Oliveira, supra note 73. 
 82.  Bids that have been made are submitted to the public in the Official Gazette. Lei 
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the time limits for all of these different procedures, before the project 
is even started, the time it may take can be between 180 days and 285 
days, if the time limits are not exceeded due to legal disputes.83 
The traditional Procurement Law has two features that, at first 
glance, may appear to promote efficiency and accountability, but that 
have created new and serious problems.  The first concerned the pre-
bidding and bidding stages.  Under the Procurement Law, these bids 
are solicited separately, and awarded to separate companies.84  The 
company that is helping the government to design the project is thus 
different from the company that builds the project.  Though four eyes 
are often better than two, the difficulty arises when the construction 
phase encounters a problem.  If the project, as designed and thus far 
built, proves inadequate, and requires additional time and money to 
complete, neither the firm that won the bid for the technical project nor 
the firm that won the construction project wishes to accept the blame.85  
Instead, each will point the finger at the other:  the construction firm 
will claim that the problem lies with the design, while the design firm 
will attribute the problem to poor execution of a blameless plan.  
Unable to settle, the two companies will proceed to litigate, obviously 
causing delays and increased costs.  Ultimately, the problem is that the 
interests of the design firm, and the interests of the construction firm, 
are not aligned; when trouble arises, each blames the other, and 
allocating fault is slow, costly, and imprecise. 
The second problem concerned the ironic tension between 
transparency and inflation.  The traditional Procurement Law followed 
the practice of “open bidding,” in which the government publicly 
announced the project’s budget before issuing its RFP.86 Open bidding 
reflected the default assumption that transparency tends to limit 
 
8.666, supra note 86; see also Government Procurement Law and Policy: Brazil, LIBR. OF 
CONGRESS (2015), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/govt-procurement-
law/brazil.php#Constitutional Principles (stating that “Article 21 of Law No. 8,666 mandates 
that all notices with a summary of the public tenders must be published in the Official Gazette 
and in newspapers with a large circulation”). 
 83.  See generally Frizzo & Oliveira, supra note 73. 
 84.  See generally Bruno Werneck et al., Construction and Projects in Brazil: Overview, 
WESTLAW (Oct. 1, 2016), https://content.next.westlaw.com/4-502-
3377?__lrTS=20170409042129047&transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&fir
stPage=true&bhcp=1. 
 85.  See generally Mohd Nasrun Mohd Nawi et al., Impact of Fragmentation Issue in 
Construction Industry: An Overview, MATEC WEB OF CONFERENCES 1, 1 (2014), 
http://www.matec-
conferences.org/articles/matecconf/pdf/2014/06/matecconf_bsfmec2014_01009.pdf. 
 86.  See generally OECD, supra note 62. 
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corruption and costs.87  However, Brazilian experience proved the 
opposite to be sometimes true.  A bidder that is capable of bidding 
substantially under the government’s budget might inflate the bid to 
more closely approximate the available government funding.88  In this 
way, open bidding tended to drive up costs.  
The Regime Diferenciado de Contratações, law No. 12462/11 and 
locally known as the RDC, is Brazil’s experiment with addressing the 
inefficiencies with traditional procurement.89  So too was the law 
passed to specifically address the procurement needs of the 2014 
World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games.90 The law is designed to 
expedite the public procurement process because of massive 
infrastructure projects that were undertaken and that are still underway 
in Brazil.91  Put another way, Brazil’s hosting of the World Cup and 
Olympics provided a catalyst to experiment with an alternative 
procurement regime. 
The law modifies the usual procurement process under the 
Procurement Law in two ways relevant to this study.  First, is allows 
the government to conduct a single, integrated bidding process for both 
the design and construction, combining the pre-bidding and bidding 
phases.92  The construction bidding no longer depends on the existence 
of an elaborate design already prepared by a separate design company 
(who had won the bid in a prior bidding process).  Instead, the 
government will provide a general description of what it needs from 
the project, and companies will simultaneously bid for the design and 
 
 87.  See generally id. 
 88.  Joseph Burns, Will Price Transparency Drive up Health Care Costs?, ASS’N OF 
HEALTH CARE JOURNALISTS (Dec. 9, 2013), http://healthjournalism.org/blog/2013/12/will-
price-transparency-drive-up-health-care-costs/comment-page-1/ (speaking to the debate 
around driving up costs in health care through price transparency; “‘[o]nce lower-paid 
physicians see what higher-paid doctors are charging, lower-cost doctors will demand higher 
rates from health insurers,’ thereby driving up premiums” (citing David Pittman, 
Transparency: Big Data Sexy and Pricey, MEDPAGE TODAY (Dec. 3, 2013), 
http://www.medpagetoday.com/PracticeManagement/Reimbursement/43236)). 
 89.  Wagner Rosa da Silva, The Use of Sealed Bidding and Competitive Negotiation in 
Brazil and Worldwide, GEO. WASH.: THE INST. OF BRAZILIAN BUS. & PUB. MGMT. ISSUES 1, 
36 (Spring 2013), 
https://www2.gwu.edu/~ibi/minerva/Spring2013/Wagner_Rosa_da_Silva.pdf. 
 90.  Lei 12462, de 4 de Agosto de 2011, PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC CIV. HOUSE: SUB-
OFFICE FOR LEGAL AFF., Agosto 2011 (Braz.). 
 91.  Rosa Da Silva, supra note 89, at 9-10 (stating that the RDC included infrastructural 
development for the 2014 Olympics, such as public security and sports facilities, in addition 
to current infrastructural projects, such as engineering services within the public school and 
unified health systems). 
 92.  See generally id. 
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construction of the project. 
Second, the RDC eliminates the requirement for open bidding.  It 
does not require the government to make its budget publicly available 
before issuing the RFP.93  The government has the option of conducting 
closed bidding, and not disclosing the budget, although the 
government has to justify doing so.94  Many believe that this process 
will produce better financial results for the government because the 
lowest bidder will not allow its bid to creep up to be as close to the 
budget as possible.   
However, skeptics of the RDC are quick to point out that this 
financial benefit comes at the apparent cost of transparency.95  The 
instinct that transparency limits corruption, and secrecy exacerbates it, 
is immediately triggered.  Moreover, some critics believe that the most 
powerful companies can use inappropriate influence to find out the 
budget amount anyway; if this were true, secrecy would indeed be 
compounding corruption. But research suggested that companies can 
no longer expect to obtain that non-public information in closed-door 
private meetings.  The mores of Brazilian government are changing. 
The RDC can be used for a limited subset of projects, including 
the World Cup and Olympic Games.  The mega-events were regarded 
as a kind of experiment in this new procurement regime.  Though most 
Olympic projects did not use the RDC, the Olympics nonetheless 
served as a catalyst for adopting this new regime.  Leading 
procurement professionals expect a post-Olympic dialogue on whether 
the RDC did in fact constitute an improvement over the traditional 
procurement system, and whether further reforms should be adopted. 
B. The Second Pillar:  Freedom of Information Law 
Law No. 12.527/2011, widely known as the freedom of 
information (FOI) law or information access law (its more common 
moniker in Brazil), was perhaps the first major signal of the 
government’s intention to enact meaningful anti-corruption law.96  
 
 93.  Id. at 9. 
 94.  Lei 12462, supra note 99. 
 95.  Rosa da Silva, supra note 89, at 39 (stating that those who prefer open bidding take 
into consideration anti-corruption measures—implying that the RDC trades efficiency for 
transparency). 
 96.  Lei 12527, de 18 de Novembro de 2011, PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC CIV. HOUSE: 
SUB-OFFICE FOR LEGAL AFF., Novembro 2011 (Braz.); Miriam Ventura, The Law on Access 
to Information, Privacy, and Health Research in Brazil 636, 636 PERSPECTIVES (2013), 
http://www.scielo.br/pdf/csp/v29n4/en_02.pdf. 
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While perhaps the least prominent of the four pillars, it would prove a 
precursor to the extraordinarily impactful statutes of 2013.   
Based on the principle, “publicity as the general precept, and 
secrecy as the exception,”97 the FOI law moves to an era of active 
transparency, in which the government is obligated to publish certain 
forms of information without a request.98 It brings an end to what 
Brazilians called the “eternal secrecy,” in which public documents had 
an indefinite period of confidentiality99 because highly classified 
documents could see their classification renewed indefinitely.100  
Indeed, when the FOI law was under consideration in Congress, some 
lawmakers had pushed for keeping the “eternal” classification for 
certain categories of documents – including nuclear and aerospace 
technology, national defense, and diplomatic relations – but the 
provision was ultimately defeated.101 So too did the bill create 
controversy about the potential disclosure of military intelligence 
concerning human rights violations during the military dictatorship.102 
The FOI law has three core components.  First, it obligates the 
federal, state, and municipal governments, and all branches thereof, as 
well as state-owned companies and even non-profits receiving 
government funds, to publish various kinds of information, including 
documents on government spending, without a request.103  These so- 
called “active transparency” obligations extend to the official contact 
details of all employees, financial operations, spending, procurement 
contracts, and answers to frequently asked questions.104  Second, the 
law empowers any citizen to request information from the government 
 
 97.  Greg Michener, Analyzing Brazil’s New Freedom of Information Law, OBSERVING 
BRAZIL (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.observingbrazil.com/2011/12/13/analyzing-brazils-new-
freedom-of-information-law/. 
 98.  Marcelo Sarkis, Access to Public Information in Brazil: What Will Change with Law 
No. 12.527/2011?, FREEDOMINFO.ORG (May 14, 2012),  
http://www.freedominfo.org/2012/05/access-to-public-information-in-brazil-what-will-
change-with-law-no-12-5272011/. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Rachel Glickhouse, Week in Review: Brazil’s Senate Passes Landmark Transparency 
Laws, BRAZIL PORTAL (Oct. 31, 2011), https://brazilportal.wordpress.com/tag/freedom-of-
information-law/. 
 102.  Fabrizio Rigout & Camila Cirillo, Evaluating Readiness for the Implementation of 
Open Government Systems: The Brazilian Case in Comparative Perspective, PLAN, 
http://www.planbrasil.com/repositorio/arquivo/artigo/Rigout&Cirillo_EvaluatingReadinessF
orImplementation.pdf. 
 103.  Sarkis, supra note 98. 
 104.  Michener, supra note 97. 
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and obliges the government to provide any such documents that are not 
classified.105 Third, it reduces the terms of confidentiality of documents 
designated as top secret, secret, and undisclosed for twenty-five, 
fifteen, and five years respectively, and ends the possibility of renewal 
of these periods.106 
Preliminary data suggest that the Brazilian government is starting 
to comply with the law, although patterns and attitudes will take time 
to reform.  According to one 2014 study, of all valid requests for 
information under the new law, 40% were unanswered, 18% were 
partially answered, and 31% received full responses.107   Of the partial 
or full responses, 51% were deemed of good quality.108  Of eight 
jurisdictions, Sao Paulo and the Federal Government had the best 
response rates.109  Notably, the two worst jurisdictions were the city 
and state of Rio de Janeiro.110 
C. The Third Pillar:  the Clean Companies Act 
While the FOI law targets the public sector, the corporate sector 
is the target of another statute.  Passed in 2013, Brazil’s Anti-
Corruption Law, also referred to as the Clean Companies Act 
(“CCA”),111 adopts a number of measures to increase corporate liability 
and accountability, and to incentivize the growth of a compliance 
industry and culture. 
Brazil had a law on the books before the World Cup and Olympic 
Games that prohibited official corruption; all governments do.  But it 
failed to create the corporate compliance culture that has proven in 
other countries to be so critical to anti-corruption enforcement.  
Enacted in 1992,112 the Administrative Improbity Law prohibits illicit 
enrichment that arises from acts of administrative misconduct.113  Both 
public officials and private individuals or entities that are a party to the 
 
 105.  Glickhouse, supra note 101. 
 106.  Rigout & Cirillo, supra note 102, at 4.   
 107.  Gregory Muchener, Audit Indicates Weaknesses in Some Brazil Jurisdictions, 
FREEDOMINFO.ORG (July 18, 2014), http://www.freedominfo.org/2014/07/brazil-must-
champion-foi-audit-indicates/. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Lei 12846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, LOBO & IBEAS ADVOGADOS, Agosto 2013 (Braz.). 
 112.  COLIN NICHOLLS ET AL., CORRUPTION AND MISUSE OF PUBLIC OFFICE 652-53 (2d ed. 
2011).  
 113.  Id. 
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illegal act may be subject to penalties under the law.114 The prohibited 
acts include a wide variety of behavior that captures “any kind of 
patrimonial advantage by reason of holding public positions,” 
including direct or indirect economic advantages to act or not act in the 
position’s official capacity.115 Public officials can also violate the law 
by hindering or entering into a public contract without due process.116 
While the Administrative Improbity law apparently covers any corrupt 
acts of public officials, and places liability on both the government 
agent and any private entity that was a party to the act, there remained 
a gaping fundamental weakness:  the statute created no corporate 
liability.117 Because sporting events, such as the World Cup and 
Olympic Games, involve corporations, this piece proves critical.   
Accordingly, in response to the Mensalão scandal and public 
protests, Brazil adopted the CCA.118  Indeed, the law marks an 
important milestone in Brazil’s fight against corruption and was 
intended by President Dilma’s administration to send a strong message 
that the corruption tides have turned in Brazil.   
The CCA’s essential prohibition is the promising, offering, or 
giving of an “undue advantage” to a public official or third person 
related to the public official.119  This provision mirror’s the bribery 
prohibition in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s Anti-Bribery Convention, to which Brazil is a party.120 
The statute also prohibits a number of other forms of corporate 
corruption concerning public tenders, shell companies, and obstructing 
public investigations of companies suspected of corporate 
wrongdoing.121  
 
 114.  Lei 8249, de 2 de Junho de 1992, art. 3., PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC CIV. HOUSE: 
SUB-OFFICE FOR LEGAL AFF., Junho 1992 (Braz.).  
 115.  COLIN NICHOLLS ET AL., CORRUPTION AND MISUSE OF PUBLIC OFFICE 652-53 (2d ed. 
2011). 
 116.  Lei 8249, de 2 de Junho de 1992, art. 10., PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC CIV. HOUSE: 
SUB-OFFICE FOR LEGAL AFF., Junho 1992 (Braz.). 
 117.  Z Scott & Elizabeth Pozolo, Brazil’s New Anti-Corruption Law: What you Need to 
Know, INSIDE COUNSEL (Feb. 12. 2014), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2014/02/12/brazils-
new-anti-corruption-law-what-you-need-to-k (stating that the implementation of Law 12846 
led the development of corporate liability in Brazil). 
 118.  See generally Kevin Roberts et al., The Brazilian Clean Companies Act – What You 
Need to Know, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 6, 2013), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=183a9d32-0131-4f62-b72d-df28eb30eb5e. 
 119.  Scott & Pozolo, supra note 117. 
 120.  Lei 12846 de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 2.8.2013 
(Braz.) at Ch. 11, Art. 5.1.   
 121.  See generally id. at Ch. II, Art. 5. 
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In comparison to the Administrative Improbity Act, and to 
comparable anti-corruption laws in other countries, the CCA has a 
number of noteworthy provisions.  First, it moves beyond the 
Improbity Act by prohibiting not just the bribing, but the solicitation 
or offer of a bribe.122  This brings the act into conformity with the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention123 and obviously serves to prohibit a 
much broader swath of conduct.   
Second, the act imposes strict liability on corpotations for the acts 
of employees.124 That is, when an employee commits a violation, the 
company automatically becomes liable; the prosecutor need not prove 
that the company intended, authorized, or even had knowledge of the 
bribe independently of the employee.125  This is similar to the U.S. 
model, but different from the U.K.  In the U.S. owing to a long-
established principle of respondeat superior, the company is liable for 
the acts of its employee as long as the employee was acting in the 
course of employment (defined very broadly) and intended at least in 
part to benefit the company.126 The U.S. statute, like Brazil’s CCA, 
does not require proof that the company was also liable, independently 
of whatever the employee did; if the employee did it while acting as an 
employee, the company is also liable.127  Similarly, under the CCA a 
company will be liable “for the wrongful acts . . . performed in their 
interest or for their benefit.”128 The U.K., by contrast, has recently 
provided companies a defense to liability for the acts of its employees.  
If the company can prove that it had a good faith compliance program 
in place – that is, that it took appropriate measures to prevent the 
violation – but the violation occurred nonetheless, the company will 
not be liable.129  Brazil’s CCA eschews the British approach, 
 
 122.  GAN Business Anti-Corruption Portal, Anti-Corruption Legislation: Brazilian Clean 
Company Act, GAN INTEGRITY (Nov. 2015), http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/anti-
corruption-legislation/brazil. 
 123.  See generally OECD, OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions, 
http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm (last visited June 15, 2017). 
 124.  Lei 12846 de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 2.8.2013 
(Braz.) at Ch. I, Arts. 1 & 2.   
 125.  Id. 
 126.  THE CRIMINAL DIV. OF THE DEP’T OF JUSTICE & THE ENF’T DIV. OF THE SEC, A RES. 
GUIDE TO THE FED. CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1, 27 (NOV. 14, 2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Lei 12846 de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 2.8.2013 
(Braz.) at Ch. I, Art. 2. 
 129.  Bribery Act 2010, c. 23 (Eng.); see also Geoffrey Gauci & Jessica Fisher-Bristows, 
The UK Bribery Act and the US FCPA: The Key Differences, ASS’N OF CORP. COUNS. (June 1, 
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containing an explicit provision holding companies strictly liable.130 
Though time will tell, this will likely mean that a company is liable no 
matter what the company did or did not do, apart from the employee.  
Thirdly, the statute makes clear that companies owned by the 
government – typically called state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) - are 
deemed an extension of the government, such that these companies’ 
employees are public officials.131 In the U.S. context, for example, 
whether employees of SOEs are foreign officials was a matter of much 
dispute, as the statute did not explicitly address the question.  Only in 
2011 did the U.S. courts resolve the question, holding just as the CCA 
now does that SOE employees are to be treated as officials.132 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the statute imposes two 
forms of liability on companies: civil and administrative.133 Notably, 
the statute does not impose criminal liability on companies, but this is 
not inappropriately lenient, much less scandalous.  Though the U.S., 
U.K., and many other jurisdictions around the world hold companies 
criminally liable, many (such as Germany) do not.134  And indeed, 
corporate criminal liability is a relatively new phenomenon in the 
history of law.  International conventions such as the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention require signatory states to hold companies liable 
in accordance with their underlying principles of law, recognizing that 
some jurisdictions simply do not recognize the criminal liability of 
corporations.135  The CCA should not be thought as somehow less 
effective in this regard.  
The CCA’s penalty provisions are especially strong; companies 
may even say severe.  The penalty is to be calculated as a percentage, 
up to 20%, of the gross earnings in the company’s most recent fiscal 
year preceding the onset of enforcement proceedings.136 Note what the 
 
2011), http://www.acc.com/legalresources/quickcounsel/UKBAFCPA.cfm?makepdf=1. 
 130.  Lei 12846 de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 2.8.2013 
(Braz.) at Ch. 2, Art. 5.  
 131.  Id.  
 132.  United States v. Esquenazi, 752 F.3d 912, 931–32 (11th Cir. 2014), superseded by 
statute on other grounds, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(9). 
 133.  See Lei 12846 de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
2.8.2013 (Braz.) at Chs. III & IV. 
 134.  Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 1481, 1493–94 (2009). 
 135.  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions art. 3, 
Dec. 17, 1997, 105 UST 1997. 
 136.  Lei 12846 de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 2.8.2013 
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statutory penalty is not.  First, it is not calculated based on the amount 
of the bribe, as some might assume; a bribe of relatively modest 
proportions could give rise to a substantial penalty.  Second, it is not a 
function of the earnings that resulted from the bribe.  In the U.S., for 
example, a company’s financial penalty for foreign bribery is 
calculated based on the profits made possible by the bribe(s).137 The 
CCA, by contrast, disregards both the size of the bribe and the size of 
the profits made possible by the bribe.  Finally, note that this statute 
does not calculate profits based on annual profits, but rather, annual 
gross earnings.  Accordingly, a company that is losing money – that is, 
one that has no annual profits – can still be fined.  Where the bribes 
proved to be bad business, and became a losing proposition, the 
company may nonetheless be fined.  So too may the company be 
debarred, or prohibited from conducting further business with the 
government, and in some circumstances may even be dissolved.138 
1. Overview of the U.S. System – to Understand the CCA 
To understand the CCA’s enforcement-side provisions, a brief 
overview of the U.S. system is helpful.  Though Brazil does not appear 
to be emulating the U.S., it is trying to build a system that now exists 
in the U.S. and has proven central to anti-corruption enforcement. 
Federal anti-corruption laws in the U.S., particularly anti-bribery 
laws, are enforced by the U.S. Department of Justice and, to a lesser 
extent, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.139  These 
agencies out of necessity have limited budgets.  The principal aim of 
public anti-corruption enforcement is to maximize general deterrence 
– to prevent persons within their jurisdiction from committing similar 
acts.  While specific deterrence refers to preventing recidivism – the 
defendant’s repeated violation – general deterrence refers to 
preventing persons other than the defendant from committing similar 
violations.  Accordingly, the U.S. enforcement agencies seek to 
maximize general deterrence while operating on a fixed budget.  It 
might be said that they are looking for the maximum general deterrence 
return on the dollar. 
 
(Braz.) at Ch. 3, art 6.1.  
 137.  Criminal Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Enf’t Div. of U.S. Sec. and Exch. 
Comm’n, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 69 (2012). 
 138.  Lei 12846 de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 2.8.2013 
(Braz.) at Ch. 6, art 19. 
 139.  Criminal Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Enf’t Div. of U.S. Sec. and Exch. 
Comm’n, supra note 137, at 2. 
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One way – the traditional way -- to achieve both specific and 
general deterrence is to bring wrongdoers to trial.  If convicted, the 
defendant company would face a stiff penalty and considerable 
reputational damage through the negative press.  However, trials 
present two challenges for the enforcement agencies.  First, they are 
extremely resource-intensive, as the gathering of evidence (discovery) 
and resulting trials are notoriously drawn-out and expensive, 
consuming vast amounts of the enforcement agencies’ time, money, 
and personnel.  Second, because they are so resource intensive, the 
agency can try a relatively small number of companies.  As a matter of 
simple math, because each company requires so much time to 
investigate and try, and assuming fixed resources, the agencies cannot 
try as many companies as they could if the trial process were 
substantially shorter than various legal and practical circumstances 
presently permit.  Finally, a trial is unpredictable; the government can 
rarely be sure that, after all the time and money spent on trying a 
company, it will actually get a conviction.  Accordingly, the U.S. 
Department of Justice realized that trials are no way to maximize the 
general deterrence “bang for the buck.”140  They would get relatively 
few companies, with unpredictable results.   
Meanwhile, criminal trials in particular are likewise a losing 
proposition for the defendant company.  The company feels the drain 
on resources, as key personnel are distracted from their regular duties 
and high-priced corporate litigators rack up billable hours. The 
unpredictability of trials is a major down side to the defendant 
company:  they may get an acquittal, but so too may they get a 
conviction with an unexpectedly severe penalty.  Finally, trials will 
generally produce negative press for a company, harming their 
reputation and, for public companies, their stock value.  Even if 
ultimately acquitted, the reputational damage can be very hard to 
overcome.   
Accordingly, as U.S. anti-corruption enforcement has increased 
over the last decade, so too has the use of alternatives to trial.141  
Increasingly, U.S. enforcement authorities are proposing, and 
companies are accepting, an alternative form of investigation and 
settlement.  Indeed, in the U.S., with anti-bribery law in particular, 
 
 140.  Id. at 52. 
 141.  See Anti-Corruption Enforcement: What to Watch in 2016, Covington, Global Anti-
Corruption Group (Covington, D.C.), Feb. 2016, at 1. See also Steven A. Tyrell et al., Anti-
Corruption Enforcement Review: Emerging Issues and Developments, Litigation Department 
(Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, New York, N.Y.), June 30, 2015 at 1. 
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trials against corporate defendants are nearly unheard of.142  Rather, the 
U.S. Department of Justice and the corporate defendants agree to 
resolve the allegations by a different route. 
This alternative route has four core components.  The first is the 
investigation stage.  When an allegation of wrongdoing arises, either 
within a company or publicly, the company may not wait for the 
government to catch wind of the suspicions and begin to investigate 
the company.  Rather, the company will often conduct its own 
investigation into its own potential wrongdoing.  With an “internal” 
investigation, typically for lesser alleged offenses, the company will 
conduct the investigation in-house.  When the misconduct is larger-
scale, more systemic, or where the in-house lawyers are potentially 
implicated, the company may conduct an “independent” investigation.  
Here, the board of directors will retain an outside law firm, one that 
has not previously represented or been affiliated with the company, to 
conduct a factual investigation into the wrongdoing and formulate 
conclusions concerning what wrongdoing may have occurred, the 
liability the company may face, and which steps the company should 
take in terms of internal governance and the retaining or firing of 
implicated personnel.  That law firm does not represent the company, 
and is not advocating on behalf of the company, but neither does it 
represent the government.  Rather, it is an independent third party, with 
no loyalties to either side of the prospective dispute, seeking an 
impartial account of the facts.  Either way, when the investigation is 
complete, a substantial factual record, and a report summarizing the 
factual and legal conclusions, will be compiled.   That report is left in 
the company’s possession. 
The second core feature of modern U.S. anti-bribery enforcement 
concerns what happens next – that is, what happens with the report.  
The company has now spent millions, or tens of millions, on an 
investigation into its own wrongdoing, and possesses a comprehensive 
report with supporting documentation.  Needless to say, the U.S. 
Department of Justice would like to get its hands on the report.  
Accordingly, it offers to the company “cooperation credit.”143  By the 
terms of this deal, if the company hands over the investigation’s 
 
 142.  See Corporate Bribery: The Anti-Bribery Business, THE ECONOMIST May 9, 2015 
(stating that more than four-fifths of FCPA cases have been settled since 2010, and only one 
trial has been commenced against a public company in 38 years). 
 143.  Dep’t of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations 
(2015), https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-
business-organizations. 
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findings, and makes its employees available to further interviewing, 
and otherwise cooperates with the government, the government will 
offer a penalty that, it claims, is substantially less than what the 
defendant would likely get if convicted at trial.144  The company now 
must make a decision.  It can risk the unpredictability of a trial, with 
its exorbitant costs, substantial drain on company resources, and 
undoubtedly negative press.  Or, it can accept the government’s offer 
of cooperation credit and turn over to the government the results of its 
investigation, buying itself a reduced penalty, predictability of 
outcome, reduced lawyer’s fees, and reduced negative press. 
Invariably, companies select the latter route:  they choose to 
cooperate.145  The turning over of its investigation conclusions is 
widely referred to as “voluntary disclosure:” the company voluntarily 
discloses the results of its findings.146  The return for voluntary 
disclosure is the cooperation credit.  Notably, the government cannot 
force companies to accept this deal, and yet the companies invariably 
do.  It is perceived to be in the interests of both parties. 
This deal culminates in the third core feature of the U.S. anti-
corruption settlement process:  the deferred prosecution agreement 
(DPA) or nonprosecution agreement (NPA).147  DPAs and NPAs are 
forms of settlement, in which the government agrees to either defer 
prosecution or to forego prosecution altogether in exchange for the 
company accepting certain terms of settlement.  The terms will include 
a penalty and might also include disgorged profits, the termination of 
various personnel, the withdrawal of business from the problematic 
markets, or acceptance of a government-imposed monitor.148  Under a 
DPA, the government in effect gives the company a trial period in 
which to demonstrate its compliance with the law and the settlement 
terms; DPAs are agreements between the enforcement agency and the 
defendant; they do not involve judicial oversight.149  With a NPA, by 
contrast, a judge will sign off on the agreement, but with minimal 
oversight.150  The difference does not prove terribly important.  DPAs 
 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Corporate Bribery: The Anti-Bribery Business, supra note 142 (analyzing the costs 
of FCPA litigation for companies and the number of companies that choose to cooperate with 
federal authorities). 
 146.  Dep’t of Justice, supra note 143. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Criminal Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Enf’t Div. of U.S. Sec. and Exch. 
Comm’n, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 74 (2012). 
 150.  Id. at 75. 
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and NPAs are two minor variations of the basic negotiated settlement. 
The fourth unique component of this enforcement procedure 
concerns the role of compliance programs.  Compliance programs are 
designed to prevent violations of given laws through training, 
monitoring, and the maintenance of an appropriate company culture.151  
With respect to a given area of federal law – be it environmental, health 
care, or in our case, anti-corruption – a company that knows itself to 
be at risk may invest in compliance to varying degrees.  Of course, it 
may not invest at all, liking its chances that it will not violate the law 
or, at least, will not get caught.  It may create a mediocre compliance 
program, and may or may not work to support that program by creating 
a culture within the company that values compliance.  Or, the company 
may take compliance seriously, investing in a first-rate program and 
taking substantial effort to back up those programs with company 
culture.   
The U.S. Department of Justice wishes to incentivize the growth 
of compliance programs, and will therefore reward companies for 
quality programs in several different stages of enforcement.  First, the 
government may decide not to investigate a company at all.152  Though 
these decisions are not public, practitioners take for granted that, given 
the Department of Justice’s limited resources, one factor it may 
consider in deciding whether to investigate a company at all is whether 
it had a quality compliance program in place at all.  Second, the 
Department of Justice may investigate a company but then decide not 
to penalize it.  That is, the DOJ does not find sufficient reason to 
penalize the company.   A formal decision not to penalize a company 
is called a declination, and while these too are rarely public, the 
government has recently publicly declined to penalize a small number 
of companies based at least in part on the quality of the company’s 
compliance program.153  Finally, when the DOJ does find sufficient 
evidence of culpability to enter into a DPA or NPA with the company, 
a quality compliance program can lead to a penalty reduction, as 
 
 151.  Dep’t of Justice, supra note 143. 
 152.  Criminal Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Enf’t Div. of U.S. Sec. and Exch. 
Comm’n, supra note 149, at 55. 
 153.  See Dep’t of Justice, supra note 161; see also Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former 
Chief Executive Officer of Oil Services Company Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charge 
(June 15, 2015) (on file with author); see also Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former Morgan 
Stanley Managing Director Pleads Guilty for Role in Evading Internal Controls Required by 
FCPA (April 25, 2012) (on file with author). 
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authorized by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.154 
Brazil’s CCA introduces a U.S.-type enforcement regime into 
Brazilian anti-corruption enforcement.  Though necessarily 
announcing that it is eschewing or even discouraging traditional trials, 
multiple provisions of the CCA are designed to foster the growth of an 
enforcement regime based on self-investigation, voluntary disclosure, 
and cooperation credit through settlements.   
First, the CCA contains a list of enumerated factors that the 
government will consider when determining appropriate sanctions.155  
The first six provisions of Chapter III, Article 7 are predictable and 
rather unremarkable: (1) the seriousness of the offense, (2) the 
advantage gained by the illicit conduct, (3) whether the illicit act was 
completed, (4) the degree or risk of damage, (5) the adverse effect of 
the conduct, and (6) the offending company’s economic 
circumstances.156 However, the next two provisions are harbingers of a 
new enforcement era.  Article 7.VII provides that penalties will be 
determined in part based on the “cooperation of the legal entity in the 
investigation” of the wrongdoing.157  This is cooperation credit.  The 
next provision, Article 7.VIII, provides that penalties will also be 
based on the existence of internal procedures designed to promote 
integrity, including but not limited to auditing, whistleblowing, and 
self-enforcement of the codes of ethics and conduct.158  These are all 
features of what the west (or north, as it were) calls a compliance 
program.   
Additionally, the CCA authorizes the relevant enforcement 
agency to enter into what the statute calls “leniency agreements.”159 
These agreements are analogous to the U.S.-style DPAs and NPAs, but 
perhaps more aptly named.  Unlike the U.S. terminology, the term 
“leniency agreement” makes its purpose more explicit:  to be lenient 
on the defendant in exchange for the defendant’s cooperation.  The 
CCA establishes several requirements that a defendant company must 
meet if it is to be entitled to a leniency agreement; these requirements 
are much more specific, and perhaps more exacting, than anything seen 
 
 154.  Dep’t of Justice, supra note 143. 
 155.  Lei 12846 de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 2.8.2013 
(Braz.) at Ch. 3, art 7. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id.at Ch. V.  
8_SPALDING.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/17  8:12 AM 
2017] BRAZIL’S OLYMPIC-ERA REFORMS 215 
 
in the U.S. system.160  Requirements companies must meet include: 
collaboration must result in identification of the guilty individuals; the 
rapid exchange of information; the legal entity must have initiated the 
cooperation; the entity must completely discontinue its involvement in 
the investigated wrongdoing; the entity must fully admit its 
participation in the wrongdoing; and fully and completely cooperate 
with the investigation until its conclusion.161  
The CCA is thus a bold effort to stimulate the growth of a new 
corporate enforcement climate – where companies invest in 
compliance programs, where they investigate their own potential 
misdeeds, and where they will cooperate with the enforcement 
agencies to efficiently negotiate settlements.   
D. The Fourth Pillar:  The Organized Crime Law  
Of the four pillars, Brazil’s new organized crime statute, passed 
in August 2013, is perhaps most remarkable, both for its impact and 
for the circumstances that led to its enactment.  The statute provides a 
definition of organized crime and authorizes a number of law 
enforcement methods to investigate and prosecute organized crime.  
The federal prosecutors’ use of these tools led to the Petrobras scandal, 
discussed in this section. 
The bill was supposedly proposed to go after organized crime 
(e.g. drug trafficking, etc.) generally and specifically to target a group 
of violent protestors known as the Black Bloc.162 During the early 
stages of congressional consideration of the bill, there was no mention 
that these enforcement tools could, or would, be used to go after high-
level officials and businesspersons engaged in graft; but, word on the 
street is that advocates pushing for adoption of this bill may well have 
understood its potential to convict the very politicians who would vote 
to support the bill.163   
Of the organized crime laws various enforcement tools, two have 
 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Lei 12846 de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 2.8.2013 
(Braz.). 
 162.  Wearing black disguises, the Black Bloc became more organized and visible in the 
2013 anti-corruption protests, engaging in vandalism and theft. See generally Lulu Garcia-
Navarro, Brazil’s Black Bloc Activists: Criminals or People Power?, NPR (Oct. 22, 2013), 
http://www.npr.org/2013/10/22/239860341/brazils-black-block-activists-criminals-or-
people-power (discussing how the Black Bloc became more organized and visible in the 2013 
anti-corruption protests, engaging in vandalism and theft). 
 163.  Spalding, supra note 45. 
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proven of particular significance to anti-corruption enforcement.  First, 
the law provides an obstruction of justice charge; specifically, a person 
who obstructs investigations is subject to the same punishment range 
as one who promotes, constitutes, or finances a criminal 
organization.164  
Second is the expanded plea bargain.  Though plea bargaining 
previously existed under Brazilian law, it was much more restricted 
and thus a much less effective tool in the prosecutor’s arsenal.   Under 
the previous regime, judges could only reduce the penalty by one to 
two thirds, or grant a pardon post-conviction if the judge determined 
that the defendant’s cooperation was useful to the conviction.165 A 
defendant could thus not be sure, at the time of confession, of the plea 
bargain’s effects on his or her conviction and sentence.  Laws that 
previously governed plea bargains include the Heinous Crimes Law 
(8.072/1990),166 the Law on Economic and Tax Crimes, and Against 
Consumer Relations (8.137/1990),167 the Law on Crimes Against the 
Financial System (7.492/1986, as amended by Law 9.080/1995),168 
Law 9.269/1996, which altered Article 159 of the Penal Code (on 
extortion with kidnapping),169 the Money-Laundering Law 
(9.613/1998),170 the Cooperation and Witness Protection Law 
(9.807/1999),171 and the Law on Combating Drug Misuse 
(11.343/2006).172 
The new organized crime law goes significantly further.  It does 
 
 164.  Lei 12850 de 2 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 5.8.2013 
(Braz.).  
 165.  Delmanto Advocacia Criminal, Introducing Plea Bargaining: A Uniquely Brazilian 
Approach, International Law Office (Dec. 16, 2013), 
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/White-Collar-Crime/Brazil/Delmanto-
Advocacia-Criminal/Introducing-plea-bargaining-a-uniquely-Brazilian-approach.  
 166.  Lei No. 8.072 de 25 de Julho de 1990, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
7.26.1990 (Braz.). 
 167.  Lei No. 8.137 de 27 de Dezembro de 1980, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
12.28.1990 (Braz.). 
 168.  Lei No. 7.492 de 16 de Juhno de 1986, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
6.18.2013 (Braz.) (amended Lei No. 9.080 de 19 de Juhno de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 7.20.1995). 
 169.  Lei No. 9.269 de 2 de Abril de 1996, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 4.3.1996 
(Braz.).  
 170.  Lei No. 9.613 de 3 de Marco de 1998, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
3.4.2013 (Braz.). 
 171.  Lei No. 9.807 de 13 de Julho de 1999, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
7.14.2013 (Braz.). 
 172.  Lei No. 11.343 de 23 de Agosto de 2006, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
8.24.2006 (Braz.).  
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not merely provide for a sentence reduction or eventual pardon.  
Rather, it allows the prosecutor to not bring charges at all under certain 
circumstances.173  Specifically, a prosecutor or judge may grant 
complete impunity, or reduce a penalty by up to two thirds, for a 
defendant who has effectively and voluntarily cooperated with the 
investigation, provided that the cooperation produces one of five 
results:  (1) the identification of other participants in the crime; (2) 
information on the structure and control of the criminal organization; 
(3) the prevention of additional criminal activity by the organization; 
(4) the complete or partial recovery of the criminal proceeds; or (5) the 
location of the victim.174 So too may the prosecutor dismiss the 
complaint against the defendant if he or she is not the leader of the 
criminal organization and is the first member of that organization to 
enter into a plea agreement with the enforcement authorities.175 
1. A Corruption Investigation that Reaches the Olympics 
The obstruction of justice charge and the enhanced plea bargain 
under Brazil’s new organized crime law made possible what may be 
the largest anti-corruption prosecution in history:  Petrobras.176 Former 
Petrobras executive Paulo Roberto Costa, who was arrested in March 
2014 for involvement in a separate money-laundering probe, accused 
more than forty politicians of participating in a vast kickback scheme 
designed to benefit the Brazilian oil giant between 2004 and 2012.177 
He alleged that the participants received as much as 3% of the value of 
contracts signed between Petrobras and the Brazilian government in 
exchange for favorable votes in the legislature.178  Prosecutors would 
eventually uncover a scheme of money laundering, drug trafficking, 
tax evasion, foreign exchange evasion, and smuggling valued at $3 
billion USD.   
This author’s interviews with Brazilian prosecutors disclosed that 
the organized crime law of 2013 made this prosecution possible.179  
Costa was at first questioned about a minor violation, and was 
 
 173.  Lei No. 12.850 de 2 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
5.8.2013 (Braz.). 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Joe Leahy, What is the Petrobras Scandal that is Engulfing Brazil?, FIN. TIMES 
(March 31, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/6e8b0e28-f728-11e5-803c-d27c7117d132. 
 177.  Id.  
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Interview with Brazilian Prosecutors, Public Prosecutor’s Office, in Porto Alegre, 
Brazil. These interviews were conducted by the author (Interview notes on file with author). 
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reportedly revealing little of what he seemed to know.  Prosecutors 
then used their new tool – an obstruction of justice charge – which they 
threatened against both Costa and his family if he did not disclose 
further information.  The threatened obstruction charge flipped Costa 
and broke open “Operation Car Wash.”180 Prosecutors have also made 
liberal use of their new plea bargaining authority, again authorized by 
the organized crime bill; as of March 2017, sixty-five plea deals had 
been signed.181 
Most significant for the Olympics is the central role of Brazil’s 
major construction companies, which obviously figured prominently 
in preparations for the World Cup and Olympics.  These construction 
companies were funding the political parties’ campaigns in exchange 
for illicit benefits in the bidding of construction projects, including but 
not limited to World Cup and Olympic venues.182 At the time of 
publication, well over a hundred persons had been convicted and over 
sixty had signed plea deals with the Ministério da Justiça.183  
Most of the people who signed the plea deals are executives or 
former executives and former directors of big construction 
companies.184 For example, Clóvis Peixoto Primo, former president of 
the construction company Andrade Gutierrez, said in his deposition 
that he paid bribes to the former Rio de Janeiro governor, Sergio 
Cabral, and the owner of the Delta construction company, relating to 
the Maracanã Stadium renovation.185 Augusto Mendonça, Toyo Setal 
executive, said in his deposition that between 2008 and 2011, he paid 
around $15 million USD to the former Services Director of 
Petrobras.186 Claudio Melo Filho, former director of institutional 
relations of Odebrecht, showed in his depositions the values that were 
given to fifty-one politicians of eleven political parties for the purpose 
of getting illicit benefits to the construction company.187 These 
politicians included the president of the Senate, Renan Calheiros and 
 
 180.  Id.  
 181.  Delatores da lava jato, POLITICA (April 4, 2017), 
http://especiais.g1.globo.com/politica/2015/lava-jato/delatores-da-lava-jato/. 
 182.  Adriano Belisario, Documento da Lava Jato sugere cartel na Olimpiada, PUBLICA 
(Apri 29, 2016), http://apublica.org/2016/04/documento-da-lava-jato-sugere-cartel-na-
olimpiada/. 
 183.  Delatores da lava jato, supra note 181. 
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current Brazilian President, Michel Temer.188 Other executives or 
former executives and former directors of large construction 
companies that signed plea deals, include Eduardo Hermelino Leite, 
former Vice President of Camargo Correia;189 Hamylton Pinheiro 
Padilha Junior, former representative of Vantage Drilling Corp;190 and 
João Carlos de Medeiros Ferraz, former President Director of Sete 
Brasil.191  As an example of how impactful these plea deals became, 
Odebrecht would eventually enter into a $3.5 billion USD settlement 
with authorities in Brazil, the U.S., and Switzerland for paying bribes 
around the world.192 
“Operation Car Wash” would eventually bring the Olympic 
Games within its snare.  The most expensive construction project 
undertaken for the Games was the $2.5 billion USD revitalization of 
the port region of Rio de Janeiro, known as “Port Maravilha.” 193 The 
Car Wash investigation has uncovered a suspicious payment of 
$300,000 to a code name “Turquesa 2.”194 The Engenharia and OAS 
construction firms are also implicated and under investigation for 
participation in the project.195  This particular scheme allegedly 
involved then-President of the Brazilian House of Representatives, 
Eduardo Cunha, who received around $700,000 USD to provide the 
construction companies special tax breaks in relation to the Olympic 
construction.196 
Not surprisingly, on the eve of the Games, 63% of Brazilians 
surveyed thought hosting the Olympics would hurt the country.197  
 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Delatores da lava jato, supra note 181. 
 192.  Richard L. Cassin, DOJ and SEC Take Small Slice of Odebrecht-Braskem $3.5 
Billion Global Settlement, FCPA BLOG (December 21, 2016, 1:18PM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/12/21/doj-and-sec-take-small-slice-of-odebrecht-
braskem-35-billion.html. 
 193.  Guilherme Costa & Vinicius Konchinski, Lava Jato aponta propina em 2a obra mais 
cara da Olimpiada, UOL (March 22, 2016), 
https://olimpiadas.uol.com.br/noticias/2016/03/22/lava-jato-aponta-propina-em-2-obra-mais-
cara-da-olimpiada-de-2016.htm. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Paulo Roberto Conde, Para 63% dos brasileiros, Olimpiada vai trazer mais prejuizos 
do que beneficios, UOL (July 19, 2016), http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/olimpiada-no-
rio/2016/07/1793059-para-63-dos-brasileiros-jogos-vao-trazer-mais-prejuizos-do-que-
beneficios.shtml. 
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There is some evidence to suggest they were right.  Six months later, 
the New York Times would run a jarring article entitled “Legacy of Rio 
Olympics So Far is Series of Unkept Promises,”198  detailing the 
economic waste and incomplete projects left in the Olympics’ wake.   
CONCLUSION 
The promises of the Olympic Games’ economic benefits may 
well have been unkept.  But the Olympics delivered, perhaps 
inadvertently, a different sort of good.  As the public decried the mega-
event’s waste, Brazil’s democratic institutions would respond most 
remarkably.  With four new statutes and a dramatic enforcement 
action, corruption would be identified and prosecuted to a degree 
unseen in the history of Brazil and, quite possibly, the world.  It was 
the Games’ unintended benefits, rather than anything predicted or 
planned, that may constitute Brazil’s Olympic legacy. 
 
 198.  Anna Jean Kaiser, Legacy of Rio Olympics So Far Is Series of Unkept Promises, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/sports/olympics/rio-stadiums-
summer-games.html?_r=0. 
